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NaTech (natural-technological) events caused by the impact of floods on industrial facilities may lead to major 
accidents following damages to structures and equipment. In this study, we explored the quantitative 
assessment of NaTech accidents triggered by floods. A specific methodology was developed, adopting 
equipment vulnerability models aimed at determining the failure frequency of equipment affected by flooding. 
A reference case study was analysed, taking into account a flood scenario impacting on an industrial facility. 
Risk results with and without flood-triggered NaTech scenarios were compared, determining the influence of 
NaTech scenarios on the overall risk profile.  
1. Introduction 
An increasing concern is present worldwide for the impact of cascading effects triggered by natural events 
(Youg et al. 2004). Severe scenarios may be expected if the impact of floods on process plants where relevant 
quantities of hazardous substances are stored or processed (Cozzani et al. 2010). Loss of containment (LOC) 
of hazardous materials may be expected, leading to direct impact on the population and to possible mid- and 
long term effects on the environment due to the release of chemicals in flood water. These events are usually 
defined as “natural-technological” (NaTech) accidents (Youg et al. 2004). Specific studies (Salzano et al., 
2009) demonstrated that NaTech events often occurred in the past, affecting industrial facilities (Renni et al., 
2010) and treatment plants (Panico et al., 2013). 
Therefore, considering NaTech scenarios in the framework of safety reports and of Quantitative Risk 
Assessment (QRA) of industrial facilities, where relevant quantities of hazardous substances are stored or 
processed, is of utmost importance (Cruz et al., 2006). This may allow for the correct assessment of the risk 
associated to site operation and for the robust and effective emergency planning in residential areas near to 
these industrial sites and in perspective may become a requirement for the safe operation of such sites.  
The present study is aimed at exploring the quantitative assessment of risk caused by floods impacting on 
industrial facilities where relevant quantities of hazardous substances are present. Specific equipment 
vulnerability models were implemented in a QRA methodology, allowing a detailed calculation of risk profiles 
due to NaTech events triggered by floods. A reference case study was defined and analyzed comparing 
results with and without flood-triggered NaTech scenarios.  
2. Methodology 
The methodology for the introduction of NaTech scenarios in Quantitative Risk Assessment was developed in 
a previous study (Antonioni et al. 2009) and is summarized in Figure 1. The recent updates to the 
methodology are briefly discussed in the following. 
The starting point of the methodology is the identification of reference flood conditions, thus determining the 
reference scenarios to be considered in the QRA. Each flood event needs to be characterized in terms of 
frequency and of severity by a sufficiently simple approach, suitable for the use in a risk assessment 
framework (step 3). The standard parameter for flood frequency evaluation is the return period (τ), that is 
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given by hydrological studies and is usually available from local competent authorities. The flooding frequency 
(f) can thus be estimated as follows: 
τ/1=f    (1) 
Next, an impact vector, whose elements represent the severity of the flood scenario, needs to be defined for 
each of the reference scenarios selected. Flood severity can be quantified by two parameters (Cruz et al., 
2006): water effective depth (hw) and water speed (vw). The effective depth should take into account the 
possible effect of protection measures, such as concrete supports higher than the ground level to which the 
vessel saddles are fixed. Simplified hazard ranking criteria based on inventory and physical state of hazardous 
substances may be used to identify critical equipment items that should be included in the analysis (step 4) 
(Antonioni et al. 2009). The application of equipment vulnerability models is then needed to assess the 
equipment damage probability (step 5). These models are discussed in the Section 2.1. Consequence 
assessment of the single scenarios triggered by the natural event (step 6) may be carried out by using 
conventional models (Van DenBosh & Weterings 2005).  
 
Figure 1: Overview of the methodology adopted for the QRA of NaTech scenarios caused by flood. 
2.1 Equipment vulnerability models 
Data on equipment failure as a consequence of floods are scarce in the literature. Antonioni et al. (2009) 
report a general correlation that allows a rough estimate of the failure probability. More recently, Landucci et 
al. have developed a simplified approach to evaluate the failure probability of vertical atmospheric tanks for 
liquid storage (Landucci et al. 2012) and of horizontal atmospheric or pressurized vessels (Landucci et al. 
2014). The approach is based on the evaluation of vessel mechanical integrity under the action of the flood, 
which results in both a “static” external pressure component, due to the depth of the flooding (hw), and in a 
“dynamic” external pressure component, due to the flood water velocity (vw) and to the associated drag force. 
It is worth mentioning that the failure following the mechanical impact by objects transported in the water is not 
accounted in the model. 
In the case of atmospheric vertical vessels, it was evidenced that the vessel filling level is the more relevant 
parameter for the evaluation of the equipment integrity and of the failure probability. Thus, a critical filling level 
(CFL) was defined for each equipment item involved in a specified flooding event of given intensity (e.g., 
having assigned hw and vw), as the liquid level below which the failure for instability is possible. The CFL for 
atmospheric vertical vessel is evaluated as follows: 
gHPghvkCFL fcrwwwww ρρ
ρ 


−+= 2
2
   (2) 
where ρw = flood water density (1100 kg/m3); kw = hydrodynamic coefficient (1.8); g = gravity acceleration 
(9.81 m/s2); ρf = stored liquid density (kg/m3); and H = vessel height (m). Pcr is the instability critical pressure 
of the vessel and may be derived applying the following simplified correlation (Landucci et al. 2012): 
21 JCJPcr +=    (3) 
where C = vessel capacity (m3); J1 = -0.199 Pa/m3; and J2 = 6950 Pa. 
On the basis of the CFL, the vessels damage probability (Ψ) is derived by the ratio between the “unsafe” 
operative conditions with respect to all the possible operative conditions, represented by the filling level ϕ: 
( ) ( )minmaxmin φφφ −−=Ψ CFL    (4) 
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In the present approach, for the sake of simplicity, a linear distribution of possible operative filling levels 
between ϕmin (=1%) and ϕmax (=75%) is assumed in the definition of Ψ for vertical vessels. Nevertheless, more 
specific data, when available, may be introduced in Eq. (4) to obtain an equipment-specific vulnerability model. 
The approach was extended by Landucci et al. (2014) in order to obtain the fragility model for horizontal 
cylindrical vessels, both atmospheric and pressurized. In this case, the possibility of having a rupture following 
the flood event is related to the resistance of the connection between the vessel framework and the ground. In 
order to estimate the failure probability of a horizontal vessel due to flood impact, two threshold parameters 
were used as a reference: the critical water velocity, vw,c and the CFL for horizontal vessels. CFL is evaluated 
in this case with the simplified correlations reported below, adopting ϕmin (=1%) and ϕmax (=90%): 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )vlvrefcwvlref BhhACFL ρρρρρρρ −−⋅+−⋅−⋅= )(    (5) 
where ρref = 1000 kg/m3, ρl and ρv are respectively the stored liquid and vapour densities, hc is the height of 
concrete basement (= 0.25 m in the present study), A and B are coefficients summarized in Table 1. The 
parameter vw,c represents a threshold condition for velocity over which the drag force generated by flood water 
is sufficient to cause the failure of the bolt connection for a given floodwater height. The simplified correlations 
for the estimation of vw,c is reported below, with coefficients defined in Table 1.  
F
cwcw hhhEv )( min, −−⋅=    (6) 
If flood water speed is higher than vw,c, the failure probability is unitary (Ψ = 100%) without adopting the 
criterion based on the CFL (e.g. by applying Eq. (4).  
Table 1:  Coefficients of the simplified correlation for the estimation of horizontal vessels critical filling level and 
water critical velocity (Landucci et al. 2014) 
Correlation coefficient Equation Definition 
A 5 A = 1.339×D-0.989, D = tank diameter (m) 
B 5 B = -1.2 (Wt-374.4)-0.107, Wt = vessel tare weight (ton) 
E 6 E = 5.497×L-0.692, L = vessel length (m) 
F 6 F = -0.06 ln(L/D)-0.375 
2.2 Consequence assessment and risk recomposition 
The main assumptions introduced for the consequence assessment of NaTech scenarios triggered by floods 
are summarized in the following. 
For horizontal vessel, flooding may cause vessel displacement, with following rupture of pipe connections and 
nozzle flanges. Thus, the release event was selected as the more severe between: (1) the release of the 
entire content of the vessel considering a full bore rupture of pipe connections (release type R1); and (2) the 
release in 10 min of the entire inventory (release type R2). Moreover when a dispersion model is applied for 
the calculation of toxic effects or of flash-fire thresholds, values in the range of 0.1 to 1mm (e.g., typical of 
water surfaces) should be selected for the roughness length (Van DenBosh & Weterings 2005).  
For atmospheric vertical tanks, a flood can affect the integrity of the tank shell due to its limited thickness. 
Hence, a catastrophic release can be assumed and the resulting liquid pool can be considered unconfined 
(release type R3). In fact, flood water level must be higher than a possible catch basin wall in order to affect 
the tank. Other possible interactions among the released chemicals and the water are not accounted for the 
sake of simplificy. 
On the basis of the above defined release scenarios and source terms, Event Tree Analysis (ETA) was 
applied to determine the possible final outcomes according to conventional procedures as those of the “Purple 
Book” (Uijt de Haag and Ale, 1999). Physical effects associated to the final outcomes of the release scenarios 
were calculated by literature models (Van DenBosh & Weterings 2005).  
Steps 7-10 were carried out following the NaTech risk assessment framework introduced for domino effect risk 
assessment (Cozzani et al. 2014). A single accidental scenario induced by flooding may thus be defined as an 
event involving the contemporary damage of k of n units resulting in k final outcomes, with k comprised 
between 1 and n. The total number of different overall scenarios that may be generated by a single flooding 
condition, Nf, may be calculated as follows: 
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The probability of a single overall NaTech scenario involving the contemporary damage of k units resulting in k 
events due to flooding, identified by the vector Jkm, may be calculated as follows: 
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where the function δ(i,Jkm) equals 1 if the i-th event triggered by flooding belongs to the vector Jkm, 0 if not. 
The expected frequency of the m-th overall flooding scenario involving k simultaneous equipment damages, 
ff(k,m), may be calculated as: 
),(),( mk
f
mk
f Pff ⋅=    (9) 
where f is evaluated according to Eq. 1. In order to limit the number of combinations considered for the risk 
assessment, a frequency cut-off value was assumed, excluding combinations of events having frequency 
lower than 10-10 1/y. More details on the determination of scenario combinations are provided by Antonioni et 
al. 2009. 
3. Application to a case study 
In order to demonstrate the application of the methodology and to understand the importance of considering 
flood-induced NaTech scenarios, a QRA of a case-study was carried out. The layout of the industrial facility 
selected for the study is shown in Figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 2: Layout for the case study: overview and population density (a); equipment positioning (b and c) 
Table 2:  Main features of the vessels selected for the case study. LG = liquefied gas, L = liquid. 
Features P1-P9 P10-P16 P17 P18-P20 P21-P23 S1 T1-T4 T5-T8 
Capacity (m3) 50 30 115 150 100 3179 6511 6511 
Diameter (m) 2.7 2.4 2.75 3.2 2.8 15 24 24 
Length or Height (m) 10 6.5 20.1 19.4 18 18 14.4 14.4 
Shell thickness (mm) 23 21 24 27 24 12.5 12.5 12.5 
Tare weight (ton) 12.3 5.9 29.2 36.1 26.2 110 165 165 
Filling level 90% 90% 90% 90% 90% 75% 75% 75% 
Substance Propylene Propane LPGa Ammonia Chlorine Solventc Gasoline Benzene 
Physical state LG LG LG LG LG L L L 
Pressure (bar) 8 8.5 2 8.5 6.7 1.05 1.05 1.05 
Liquid density (kg/m3) 615 450 550 600 1400 650 750 877 
Vapor density (kg/m3) 13.8 15.4 4.8 4.9 19.3 0.97b 0.97b 0.97b 
Inventory (ton) 32 12 59 84 140 1550 3656 4275 
Release typed R2 R2 R2 R2 R2 R3 R3 R3 
Final outcome Flash fire Flash fire Flash fire Tox. disp. Tox. disp. Pool fire Pool fire Pool fire 
Frequency (1/y) 4.5×10-7 4.5×10-7 4.5×10-7 5.0×10-7 5.0×10-7 4.5×10-6 4.5×10-6 4.5×10-6 
a: assumed as pure butane; b: average density of the purge gas (e.g., nitrogen blanketing); c: flammable 
liquid; see definition in Section 2.2 
 
Table 2 reports the features of the vessels considered and the inventories of hazardous substances. Both 
horizontal and vertical tanks were considered, as shown in Figure 2b and 2c. All the horizontal vessels were 
assumed to be supported on a concrete base (0.25m higher respect to ground level). 
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Figure 2a shows the population density adopted for the calculation of societal risk. A single flood scenario was 
considered in the QRA study, with a return time of 500 y, water depth hw = 2 m and water velocity vw = 0.5 
m/s. The flooding frequency was derived applying Eq. (1), obtaining f = 2×10-3 1/y. 
In order to understand the importance of NaTech scenarios triggered by floods, a QRA of the “conventional” 
scenarios due to internal failures was first performed, to obtain reference values for individual and societal 
risk. The expected frequency of top events were defined according to (Uijt de Haag and Ale 1999) and are 
summarized in Table 2. The physical effects calculated by literature models (Van DenBosh & Weterings 2005) 
were then implemented in the Aripar-GIS software (Cozzani et al. 2014). 
4. Results and discussion 
Table 3 shows the release frequencies obtained from the equipment vulnerability models considering the 
reference flood scenarios and the equipment geometrical data. The failure probabilities calculated were lower 
than 20% for atmospheric tanks. In the case of pressurized horizontal vessels, higher vulnerability values (up 
to 100% failure probability) were obtained. As shown in Table 3, the critical velocity vw,c for all the pressurized 
tanks is higher than the value of vw assumed for the case study. Hence, tank failure probability was evaluated 
only according to the estimated CFL, thus due to the high depth of the considered flooding. 
Table 3: Vessel failure probability and frequency of loss of containment calculated for the case study.  
Vessel vw,c (m/s) CFL Vulnerability (%) Frequency (1/y) 
P1-P9 0.9 0.699 77.40% 1.55×10-3 
P10-P16 1.24 1 100.00% 2.00×10-3 
P17 0.56 0.832 92.30% 1.85×10-3 
P18-P20 0.57 0.576 63.60% 1.27×10-3 
P21-P23 0.6 0.304 33.00% 6.60×10-4 
S1 - 0.135 16.90% 3.38×10-4 
T1-T4 - 0.153 19.30% 3.86×10-4 
T5-T8 - 0.131 16.30% 3.26×10-4 
Table 4:  Cumulated frequencies of flood-triggered scenarios, considering the possible failure combinations. 
FF = Flash fire; TOX = toxic dispersion of ammonia or chlorine; PF = pool fire 
P1-P9 P10-P16 P17 P18-P20P21-P23S1, T1-T4, T5-T8 
Simultaneous final 
outcomes 
Cumulated 
frequency (1/y) 
D AD AD D ND ND TOX & FF 3.42×10-4 
D AD AD D ND D TOX & FF & PF 2.18×10-4 
D AD AD ND ND ND FF 1.96×10-4 
D AD AD D D ND TOX & FF 1.68×10-4 
ND AD AD D ND ND TOX & FF 9.98×10-5 
D AD AD ND D ND TOX & FF 9.63×10-5 
 
On the basis of the failure frequencies estimated from the equipment vulnerability models, about 30000 
scenarios (over a total number of 232–1 possible combinations) resulted in a frequency value above the cut-off 
value of 10-10 1/y, but only 11000 of them contribute significantly to the overall risk. For the sake of simplicity, 
a summary of the scenarios triggered by the reference flood event are reported in Table 4, where also their 
description and expected simultaneous final outcomes are described. 
Figure 3a reports the individual risk calculated for the conventional scenarios considered for the case-study. 
The risk contour at the threshold value of 10-6 1/y is within the industrial area, while only lower individual risk 
levels are present in the residential areas. Societal risk is expressed in terms of Potential Life Loss (PLL), 7.5 
fatalities per thousand year are expected. When flood-triggered NaTech scenarios are considered, individual 
risk values increase up to three order of magnitude with respect to those obtained considering only 
conventional scenarios (see Figure 3b). This is mainly due to the fact that typical flood frequencies calculated 
on the basis of the expected return times are higher than the typical baseline frequencies for technological 
accidents. Moreover, multiple scenarios increase the severity of the consequences due to the simulations 
failure of equipment. This is confirmed by the values calculated for PLL, that increased to 4 fatalities/y when 
including NaTech events. The analysis of the case studies demonstrated that a high impact on the risk profile 
of industrial facilities storing and processing hazardous materials is associated to NaTech scenarios caused 
by flood events. This is due to the fact that, in flood-prone zones, flooding frequencies may reach values that 
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are orders of magnitude higher with respect to those related to component failures due to internal causes 
(e.g., mechanical failure, corrosion, erosion, rupture induced by vibrations, etc.). Therefore, a risk-based 
approach might be suggested for the design of supports and anchorage of safety-critical units, as those 
storing or processing flammable or toxic liquefied gases under pressure. The protection design should take 
into account both parameters related to the credible flooding scenarios and the resistance of the vessel. 
 
Figure 3: Individual risk contours (1/y) calculated for a) accident scenarios deriving from conventional release 
events due to internal failures; b) introducing NaTech triggered by flooding. 
5. Conclusions 
A methodology for the assessment of risk contribution associated to NaTech scenarios triggered by floods 
was presented. The methodology was based on the implementation of equipment vulnerability models to 
calculate the failure probability of tanks as a function of flood severity. The application to a case-study 
confirmed that NaTech scenarios caused by floods may have an important influence on industrial risk. The 
methodology application also highlighted the importance of an appropriate design of the vessel supports and 
basements to limit the potential impact of floods on process and storage equipment. 
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